



AIBR
Revista de Antropología
Iberoamericana
www.aibr.org

Volume 16
Number 2

May - August 2021
Pp. 397 - 418

Madrid: Antropólogos
Iberoamericanos en Red.
ISSN: 1695-9752
E-ISSN: 1578-9705

Klandos and Jakartas. Informality and State in Two Mobility Systems in Lower Casamance, Senegal

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Submitted: December 04, 2018
Accepted: February 07, 2020
DOI: 10.11156/aibr.160209e

ABSTRACT

This article presents and analyses a series of social processes by which both the unregulated shared taxi system — *klandos* — and the motorbike taxi system — *jakartas* — operate within the dynamics of movement in the historical and natural region of Lower Casamance (Senegal). Focusing on Ziguinchor, the principal town, it looks in detail at the rationale behind these processes and opens up a critical discussion on the notion of “informality” as it is applied to urban African contexts. We examine both daily and ambivalent links between an apparently illegal public service and the state which tolerates, and even protects it, relying on it to meet the mobility needs of civil servants, while also subtly exercising control over it.

KEY WORDS

Mobility, artisanal transport, public space, informality, Senegal.

KLANDOS Y JAKARTAS. INFORMALIDAD Y ESTADO EN DOS SISTEMAS DE MOVILIDAD URBANA EN LA BAJA CASAMANCE, SENEGAL

RESUMEN

Este artículo da cuenta y analiza la serie de procesos sociales por los que tanto el sistema de taxis colectivos no autorizados apodados *klandos* como el sistema de mototaxis *jakartas* se insertan en las dinámicas de movilidad que tienen lugar en la región histórica y natural de la Baja Casamance, en Senegal, fundamentalmente en Ziguinchor, su núcleo urbano principal. Prestar atención a su lógica contribuye a una discusión crítica a propósito de la noción de «informalidad», tal y como suele aplicarse a contextos urbanos africanos, en tanto permite atender a las articulaciones, a la vez cotidianas y ambivalentes, entre una oferta de servicio público supuestamente ilegal y un Estado que la tolera y hasta ampara en orden a atender determinadas necesidades de movilidad, pero también a ejercer sutilmente su control.

PALABRAS CLAVE

Movilidad, transporte artesanal, espacio público, informalidad, Senegal.

Introduction

This article¹ aims to show how two types of collective transport — unauthorized taxis known as *klandos* and motorbike taxis known as *jakartas* — who are active in Ziguinchor, the main city of the Lower Casamance region, in Senegal, provide a sample of functioning logics from an entire range of mobility alternatives that aren't directly managed by its respective Administrations, which are in many ways operating on the fringes of the law. Largely as a consequence of the lack of publicly provided transportation options, the presence of this kind of non-institutionally controlled mediums of mobility, although not novel, are becoming structural centerpieces in the provision of urban and interurban transport in various West African cities².

The development of this semi-regulated sector is partly affected by a two-fold process that includes the disappearance of large state transport companies and the filling of this open space by a variety of informal operators — in a dynamic some have insisted on describing as a “default self-regulation” (Diaz Olvera, Plat, Pochet and Mäidadi, 2012). This has made it possible for the most disadvantaged classes to minimally exercise their right to mobility, while simultaneously constituting a niche for employment and micro-business initiatives for a large part of the population. The above tends to present itself accompanied by the appearance or intensification of other external costs, occasionally derived from the reinforcement of the market order, which consequently reinforces the already existing forms of social exclusion and socio-spatial segregation. This is presented as a disloyal competition that supposedly threatens the most regularized modes of transport. It is important to add that one of the worst consequences of the above is an increase in road accidents.

Taking the previous as a starting point, the present article's objective is to critically discuss the notion of informality and how it is applied to particular urban and inter-urban mobility systems in the contexts of urban Africa, like the ones described in this case. Through the presented cases this article manifests the lack of opposition, the porosity and articulation between what is distinguished as formal, relative to the areas protected by the law and submitted to full administrative control, and the informal,

1. The research reported here is a R&D Project *Urban transformation, transport systems and road accidents in Africa* (ref. CSO2015-68476-P), financed by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness and directed by Manuel Delgado Ruiz and Roger Sansi Roca.

2. The work that is presented here wants to be a contribution to the debates on the functionality and operability of African States, their social legitimacy and their ability to control the territories they administer, a problem well summarized in Iniesta, López Bargados and Roca, 2013.

understood as activities on the fringes of regulation (Lindell and Ampaire, 2016; McFarlane, 2012 y 2016). In this sense, *klandos* and *jakartas* are a good example of this permeability. These alternative modes of transport, whose management and use are apparently realized on the margins of legality and State control, are an example of a loss of the State's and law's power and presence, while also are an example of a double movement that might seem paradoxical. On one side, they imply the execution and prerogative of the State and their will to externalize services in favor of private management and, simultaneously, denote forms of intervening in sectors whose functioning is supposedly alien. Therefore, we are taking the case of Casamantian collective taxis and motorbike taxis, which are an example of public transport offers that in turn are also an example of dynamics of privatization and implicit interventionist policies by the State's hand.

The ethnographic material presented here is a result of an investigation conducted in mid 2016, and still ongoing, in Lower Casamance — divided into eight periods of fieldwork that spanned between two and four months in the field, undertaken by two of the authors of this article. Fieldwork was specifically conducted in the most important urban nucleus of Lower Casamance, Ziguinchor, which has about 289,904 inhabitants³, with a notable industry of agricultural processing and fish products of the region — most notably peanut and shrimp. This area is becoming the first stop of many touristic activities to the nearing beaches of Cap Skirring, the neighboring department capital, Oussouye, as well as a connector to other enclaves like Mpack, Adéane, Bandial, Kagitte, among others. Fieldwork was based, first of all, on the direct observation of the daily activity of *klandos* and *jakartas*, both in the *garages* and *arrêts* where, we will see, they organize themselves, as well as in the journeys they carry out. In this sense, it is worth highlighting the importance of travelling with both mediums of transport as a source of ethnographic information, which has been largely registered in what has come to be known as mobility studies and, particularly, the so-called (*new*) *paradigm of mobilities* (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Such paradigm not only highlights the lack of attention given to the question of movement, mobilities and immobilities by a larger part of Social Sciences, but also emphasizes the need to incorporate transfers themselves to applied research methods. Such suggestion could be called a mobile ethnography, not only referring to *being in motion* but also taking into consideration changes of position in a given territory, generating a setting that gives way to specific forms

3. Based on 2018 data from Population Data. Viewed at: <https://www.populationdata.net/pays/senegal/>. Accessed November 24, 2019.

of sociability and even social structuring (Malet and Horta, 2014). This material was collected by frequently visiting stations and routes, which were then completed with semi-structured in-depth interviews, as well as other information that was gathered from less formal encounters and spontaneous conversations with *klando* and *jakarta* drivers, users, and other actors involved in the daily life of these unauthorized means of transport. The former includes association representatives, members of law enforcement, and representatives of administrative entities that in theory supervise this transport activity and eventually sanction it.

“Informal” systems of mobility in West Africa

Through fieldwork experience, we will attempt to sustain that the conditions in which the activities of *klandos* and *jakartas* are taking place in Ziguinchor, as well as those with similar characteristics in other Senegalese cities (Faye, 2013), exposes an ambiguous relationship between “informal” means of transport and a tolerant but predatory Administration. This Administration both tolerates *klandos* and *jakartas*, while simultaneously capitalizing on them as an alternative to collective transport. This Administration shows no signs of attempting to meet legal requirements for this means of transport whilst still profiting from them. All of this takes place within a State which structures mainly rely on the externalization of its functions to intermediaries which aren’t directly linked to its governmental apparatus, but also relies on the oblique control of sectors categorized as informal. Indeed, especially when speaking of so called “developing countries”, the consideration of the cases at hand cannot dispense with a broader framework underneath the epigraph of “informal transport”, with alternative designations like Godard (2002) proposes of “artisanal transport” or, before that, Cervero (1992) and the term “paratransit”. Cervero (2000) refers to this type of transport infrastructure as not organized by public authorities, but arising from “uncontrolled” initiatives — at least from a governmental perspective — so these transport infrastructures generally only obey market laws, operating in different degrees of illegality or allegality⁴.

4. Until recently, this type of mobility system has appeared associated with the underground economy that would dominate many sectors of activity in non-industrialized countries. Today, we know to what extent they are present and active in cities with advanced capitalism. Uber, Cabify, Glovo, Amazon... among many other, are platforms that move people or products in undefined areas or outside the respective labor and transport laws (for example, Silva, 2015).

In this way, by understanding the appearance of new actors and powers that enter into competition with the exercise of the State authority as part of their indirect intervention (Hibou, 1999: 9), the perspectives presented here create an opportunity to reconsider points of intervention from the State beyond the borders of its institutions. Next to these, considerations like the one by Diouf (1999) discuss the novelty of the African case and the splitting of the State through an indirect government that has the participation of private intermediaries (1999: 17). Effectively, taking into account the way in which some West African states have been built, like Senegal itself, Diouf highlights the recurrent pattern of an Administration that is partially delegated to actors that are, apparently, at the margins of the state apparatus dating back to colonial times. This is where the recovery of the idea of “discharge” that Max Weber (2001) suggested has been relevant to refer to how the feudal lords used peasants not only as labor, but also as tenants, precisely to unload on them the risks of exploiting the fields (2001: 52-53). Hibou (1999) was the one who had the foresight of applying this notion to the way in which certain African states *discharged* functions that would correspond to them to informal operators, rescuing them from there consideration, which isn’t infrequent (for example, Mfoulou Olugu, 2016) in terms of pathology and dysfunctionality.

At the same time, some works produced in the beginning of our century (Blundo, 2001; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2001) point out that the role of what has come to be called informal — frequently associated with corruption, also understood as a way of political patronage (Ndiaye, Wade, Pedrazzini, Chenal y Kaufmann, 2009) — within this dynamic of privatization and intervention of the African states. This way, conjointly with forms of formal privatization, we find parallel means of informal privatization as well as an institutionalization of the informal as a way of managing the State on a daily basis. Both processes would contribute, in an apparently contradictory way, to ensure the continuity and functioning of State structures.

The place of *klandos* and *jakartas* in the organization and the management of mobility in Lower Casamance

The ethnographic material that will be exposed cannot be understood at the margins of the particularities of the region at hand. The separation of Casamance in regard to the rest of Senegal, with the interposition of Gambia’s territory, has important consequences on the relationship of the

area with the economic center of the country. To this territorial discontinuity a historical lack of means of transport must be added, especially by land way, complicating communication with Dakar. These are an inheritance of urbanization policies and communication routes during the French colonization, designed not only to optimize the benefits in the exploitation of resources, but also destined towards social control and spatial segregation, focusing a good part of investment in infrastructures in the central areas of the country, its north (Nojh, 2009; N'Gaidé, 2009).

To the difficulty that supposes passing through Gambia and the weak communication with the capital it must be added the lack of infrastructures that facilitate access to interior towns, all of this occurring in a landscape dominated by mangroves. The bad state of the roads not only makes them more difficult to navigate throughout the year, but also during rainy season — from June to October — some of these roads become obstructed or even disappear, isolating some enclaves of the region. To this we must add the consequences of the armed conflict for independence (1982-2004) that has only sharpened the isolation of the region (Fent, 2019) in addition to exacerbating security issues in interurban travel.

Simultaneously, it isn't a new phenomenon, generally in West Africa, the fact that the incorporation of younger people, coming from rural areas to urban, adhere mostly to what is called submerged economy. Particularly, this mostly masculine and young workforce starts to devise strategies of survival that frequently result in employing themselves in the submerged economy of irregular transportation. In addition to being a rich ground for employment, this sector allows for the emergence of popular forms of what is called entrepreneurship, in societies in which social categories tend to confuse themselves (Malukisa Nkuku, 2019). To the delivery of adaptive solutions to a chronic socioeconomic crisis — that in some areas might reach the growth factor range — additionally there is the contribution of immediate solutions to issues of daily mobility in cities like Ziguinchor and regions like Lower Casamance, with an insufficient supply of formal means. All of this motivated the active tolerance of a State Administration that historically has prioritized other territories when it comes to investing in infrastructures. It is within this context, that we must pay attention to the way in which *klandos* and, in recent years, *jakartas* have inserted themselves into these dynamics of mobility observable in the area, considering the conditions in which they have emerged as a lower occupancy alternative for daily travel for a large part of the population whilst also bearing in mind not only the advantages but also the issues that arise in the development of their daily activity.

The term *klando* or *clando* — derived from *clandestine* — makes reference to those private cars that carry out collective transport services, despite not having a license for it. In the case of Ziguinchor and, more broadly, the Lower Casamance region, although this type of transport would have been present at least since the beginning of the 1980's and would have played an important role during the contentious years of armed conflict in the area, in the last decade full time and part time workers dedicated to this transport activity has increased. Oppositely, motorbike taxis are a means of transport that has more recently entered the African context, even though they can be seen as the inheritance of the bicycle taxi tradition that was already present in rural contexts back in the 1930's (Morice, 1981). The name motorbike taxis receive in Senegal allude to the city of which its first imports came from: the capital of Indonesia, Yakarta. Though the name has been maintained over time, currently the commercialization of the *jakarta* motorcycles is dominated by the Chinese market, which sells vehicles of a lower quality but at a more affordable price. Due to the low cost of this model, the *jakartas* pass from being only a hundred in 2012 in Ziguinchor to more than 3,000 today⁵.

In this case, what would make *klandos* and *jakartas* “informal” is the lack of an official *licence de transport*, which authorizes a service of passenger and commodity transport, which does not necessarily imply that they do not have the required documents for their private vehicle to circulate. However, the latter could also be possible if taking into account that not having one's documents in order isn't at all that unusual among the fleet of vehicles in circulation. In the case of motorbike taxis, their recent use as a means of common transport places them in a situation of legal limbo, as there is no documentation or regulation to regulate the use of motorcycles providing these types of services. Beyond seeming completely paradoxical, both issues highlight the way in which, in these types of activities based on self-regulation, the intervention and the control of the Administration and its people aren't completely absent, making evident, as we mean to highlight in this article, the simultaneous processes of formalizing of the informal and the informalizing of certain state devices.

5. Both in the case of the *klandos* and the *jakartas*, there is no official data on their presence in Ziguinchor. Due to the general lack of statistical information, based on direct observation and more or less formal conversations with local authorities and drivers during fieldwork, we can say that around 500 *klandos* were operating in Ziguinchor at the end of 2018. As for *jakartas*, it was estimated that we could speak of between 3,000 and 5,000. Although until January 2018 there were only 809 motorcycle taxi license plates registered in the Ziguinchor Regional Division of the Ministère des Infrastructures et des Transports terres et du Désenclavement, and that according to the official of the office, in the last six months of 2017, free registration of this type of vehicle was offered to promote its regulation.

***Klandos*. Negotiated secrecy**

As it occurs in other Senegalese cities, and following the model that the case of Dakar for its functioning (Lammoglia, Faye y Josselin, 2012), in Ziguinchor a good part of its nearly 500 *klandos* in circulation organize themselves in *garages*, from which they depart to different destinations, all of them covering fixed routes. Currently, *klandos* are spread across a total of four *garages* found in different parts of the city, from which they cover trips towards enclaves like Bandial, Kagitte, Mpack or Adéane, in between about 10 to 30km from the capital of the region, for a price between 500 to 800FCFA (0.77 and 1.22€), depending on the distance covered. But, in addition to these interurban destinations, there is a single intraurban service that connects the market of Boucotte, one of the main markets of the city, and the Université Assane Seck, for the price of 100FCFA (0.15€).

Reproducing the model of the *gare routière*, the *garages* tend to be unpaved plots, open in the urban center or next to one of the main roads that leave from it. In the majority of these *garages*, the drivers themselves have enabled a sort of porch where drivers and passengers can wait in until departure; sharing a space with women who take advantage of the concentration of possible clients to sell coffee, tea, juice, biscuits or fruit. In addition to these women, there are walking vendors who offer all sorts of products ranging from clothing and wigs to products for daily hygiene. In this space, we also find the drivers of other vehicles, especially *jakartas*. Despite of the small singularities that characterize each one of them, the functioning of different *garages* of the city is similar and shares a good part of its characteristics with the ways in which other normalized transports are organized in the city. In this scenario, the figure of the *coxeur* is key, as it is in any general organization of different transport systems, informal or regular, in Senegalese cities like Ziguinchor. This figure performs different functions ranging from giving information to the users and clients to the coordination of a big part of the transport activity that takes place in the *garages* and the *gares routières*, but also — it must be stressed — assumes the task of mediation between administrative authorities or police figures (Seck, 2006).

It is especially interesting the way in which the relationship between administrative bureaucracy and systems of transport like *klandos* and *jakartas*⁶ arises in terms of spatial negotiation in Ziguinchor, particularly

6. There is nothing anarchic about the operation of the so-called informal transport in Africa, not even when this disorder has been presented as “creative”, as Godard (2002) or Sahabane (2003) have suggested.

in relation to the usufruct of publicly owned spaces by this type of transport activities. Both illegal collective taxis and motorbike taxis end up raising public space management problems. The resolution of these issues by the City Council has consisted in transferring their own land to them, a solution that isn't far from the usual in other cities that enable public spaces for informal street vending. In the case of the four *klando garages* currently active in Ziguinchor, despite the particularities of each one, all of them share similar processes that have brought them to their locations, all of which the municipality was a fundamentally central actor in its decision-making. In this manner, at least three of them — two of the ones that carry out interurban routes, in addition to the one that connects the market with the university — have a common origin in apparently spontaneous concentrations of vehicles in the entrance of the Boucotte market. These extended themselves since at least the beginning of the 1990's and approximately until around 2007, when the City Council needed the terrain for the construction of a bank's headquarters, alleging that the presence of said vehicles would provoke major traffic problems in one of the busiest urban centers of Ziguinchor. Always following the information offered by members of these different *garages*, it was only then that the municipality offered different spaces that nowadays occupy within the city, including the *gare routière* — the bus terminal — where some of them stay.

This relocation was product of an unspoken agreement between *klandomans* and the City Council⁷, providing an excellent example of how public space, in the sense of Administration property, is put in the service of public interest, as it is appropriate, but of a public interest that is served informally. In this case, like in others, the paradox of supplying publicly owned terrains to the usufruct of illegal activity arises, warning that these submerged logics disarticulate the difference between the regulated and the deregulated — read as self-regulated. Subject to law, as a space recognized and approved as State owned, the State exercises its monopoly over its management by making it available to a group that presents itself and its work as clandestine and that acts largely on the fringes of the law.

The formal-informal synergy in transport can meet very explicit emergencies, such as the use of *klandos* to cover important events that require transport of authorities and guests. In these cases, despite being unauthorized vehicles of public transport and, as we'll see, find themselves being harassed daily by the police, an agreement is reached with the *garage*

7. In effect, the representatives of the municipal authorities interviewed thus far deny the existence of any official agreement between the City Council and *garages*, which does not imply the existence of a tacit and provisional assignment until the municipality is in need of these spaces again.

organization to employ part of its fleet for certain opportunities. An example of this took place during this investigation when some drivers that covered the route between Boucotte and the university were part of the retinue accompanying the minister of Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation in his visit to the Université Assane Seck on February 24, 2018. The *klandomans* that served the event were uniformed with a shirt with the image of the member of government present in the city.

Parallel, it is useful to tend to some economic aspects of the organization of this transport system, as they present other facets of the ambiguous presence of the State in the management of the *klandos*. It must be emphasized that a great part of *klando* drivers aren't owners of the vehicles they use, which are mostly old cars — many older than 30 or 40 years old — obtained from Gambia, Guinea Bissau or inside Senegal, in Touba. They are then modified in multiple ways in order to extend their utility life or increase their transport capacity. Taking into account that one of these vehicles can cost a minimum of 2 million FCFA (about 3,000€) a quantity that is insurmountable for a great part of these drivers, it is people with acquisitive capacity — mostly government officials belonging to State security force or Sufi religious leaders⁸ — who “make [the car] work” as a salary supplement or an extra source of income. This is how the same system of transport is reproduced, as seen in other means of transport (formal or not), in which the driver delivers 5,000FCFA (7.62€) a day to the owner in order to work with his vehicle. The fuel consumed during a working day is borne by the driver himself, which might benefit him depending on the trips made. Lastly, at the end of the month the car owner receives a salary, which oscillates between 25,000 and 30,000FCFA (38.11 and 45.73€), depending on the agreement reached.

What is significant of this organization, which, as we'll see, is also reproduced in the case of the *jakarta* motorbike taxis, is the key presence of owners who are employed in different State organisms, especially national police agents, the gendarmerie or, even, but less frequently so, members of the army, whom the Senegalese law prohibits owning means of provision services, including vehicles used for joint transportation. Beyond the revenue these owners obtain from the work of these vehicles, this situation conditions State intervention — as has been observed on the

8. Here we do not address the role of the Morabite brotherhoods within the organization of public transport systems in Senegal, which is the focus of much of our ongoing research. Therefore, we cannot fail to underline their importance. On this aspect, see Lombard, Jérôme and Seck (2008).

ground — conditioning the eventual fines on vehicles belonging to a colleague — or even a superior — of the agent who carries out the report.

In the case of *klandos*, it has already been mentioned that it was the same Municipality that gave up some of the lots that the *garages* now occupy in the city. It was also from the on that *klandomans* started to pay — in the same way in which we'll see is required by *jakarta* drivers — 300FCFA (0.46€) to the RPM — Recette de Perception Municipale, organism in charge of tax collection for the Commune — as a Bon de Stationnement (parking voucher). For those carrying out interurban routes, they deliver said sum when passing checkpoints situated on the city exit. In the case of those with a single interurban route, every morning, between nine and noon, an RPM agent visits the *garage* and collects the money from the drivers who are working. Generally, it is always the same agents who carry out these collections, and seem, to a certain extent, integrated into the daily activities of the *klandos*, even though it takes place in a latently tense environment that sometimes comes to fruition under certain circumstances in the shape of jokes or discussions. However, and despite the fact that said agent writes down the license plates of the vehicles which have paid and hand in a receipt as proof of disbursement, in accordance with the testimony given by representatives of the RPM itself, said recollection isn't official, because it does not exist in any record nor is the volume collected enumerated anywhere. Therefore, simply providing one more example of informal strategies during their auditing activities and the exercises of authority by authorities themselves.

The relationship between *klandomans* — and also *jakartamans* — and the Administration takes on other forms beyond the payment of taxes or the assignment of public space. To these, we can add dynamics of patronage by some political figures that try to secure the vote of the *garage* workers and the association in exchange for a variety of favors. Similarly, as it tends to occur in great part of the so-called informal sector, a fraction of all the daily contacts with State organisms takes place through the police. To the material precarity in which these drivers develop their work we must add the harassment of agents, who take advantage of the situation of irregularity to obtain certain revenue, mostly economic. This example, once again, makes it possible to emphasize the diffuseness between the “formal” and the “informal” and the ways in which, in this case, the State resorts to practices that escape legality to obtain benefits precisely in the same illegal nature of the activities they are prohibiting. In this way, to the set of daily expenses, which *klando* drivers must bear, we must add the sums of money they pay out in bribes to the police. In the case of the Boucotte *garage* these donations are divided in two daily donations of

500FCFA, where agents come collect money twice daily. Meanwhile, for *klandos* that conduct interurban routes the daily payment is of 1,000FCFA (1.52€). Similarly, in routes that go through a shared checkpoint of the police and gendarmerie, drivers must add another daily 1,000FCFA for “donations”. Hence the close to 2,000FCFA (3.05€) that they pay in daily bribes to the police, divided in multiple “donations” of 500 (0.77€) to the agents that pass by Boucotte’s *garage* throughout the day.

The observed confirms until which point it is important to consider these “corrupt” conducts by public employees in Africa — and other places — as they allow us to contemplate the real functioning of the State, so different and distant from the official (Blundo, 2001; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2001). When it comes to the relationship between the Administration and the *garage* we will find not only a testament of the institutionalization of corruption and patronage in Senegal, but also its trivialization, as they occur as the most normal and predictable thing, “opencast”, as Bako-Arifari (2007: 182) describes in relation to the illegal practices by transport officials in Sub-Saharan countries. In this case, perhaps this kind of practices could be read as a mechanism that allows the Administration to complete the salaries of some workers, something to which must be added the benefits that, as has been noted, some of them obtain from being owners of the same vehicles their colleagues sanction.

***Jakartas*. Organization and conflict**

According to our informants, the first motorbike taxis that started to operate in Ziguinchor were in 2009 and they were known as *jakartas*, alluding to the Indonesian origin of the first motorcycles that arrived in Senegal and dominated the market until 2005, when the diplomatic relationship with China was reestablished. This is how, in 2016, the import of motorcycles from China reached up to 86% of the market, almost entirely thanks to the commercialization of *jakartas*. Far from what its popular nomenclature suggests, motorcycles travel from China in plastic pieces conglomerated in a wooden box like *tetris*, which is later assembled by Senegalese mechanics upon arrival. Motorcycles of up to 125cc were mass-produced at a low cost by the Chinese brand KTM (King Town Tianma Motorcycle). Its price oscillated between 340,000FCFA (around 500€) and 390,000FCFA (around 600€). Whoever had the opportunity of accessing financing schemes could acquire this vehicle and put it in circulation with a conventional license plate with the acronym ZG (for Ziguinchor), without any markings indicating the function of the vehicle in question. The fact that they do not have specialized license plates for

their activities has provoked that motorcycles can transit without any type of special permit; you must only acquire a *Carte Grise* from the City Council for about 40,000FCFA (around 60.98€) in order to start driving.

The characteristics that shape the business model of motorcycle tax is in Ziguinchor are not different to those in other countries of the same African zone, which are based on kinship relationships, not necessarily only those linked by blood (Ehebrecht, Heinrichs and Lenz, 2018; Keutcheu, 2015; Mahamat Hemchi, 2015). Generally, the purchase of a motorcycle is a result of the use of one's own accumulated capital, mostly by civil servants — teachers, policemen or military men —, or is the result of other informal financing mechanisms. The owner of the vehicle rents the motorcycle to one, two or three *jakartamans*, who pay a daily fee of 2,500FCFA (3.81€), with the infrequent possibility of negotiating that, after a period of exploitation, the ownership is transferred to the driver. Nonetheless, it is very infrequent for the latter to occur, as for the driver to become the owner, and even if the owner respects the agreement, this does not occur until after at least one year of activity, which is the life span of a KTM motorcycle of one to three years. It must be noted that after the first year the costs of maintenance increment, which affects the profitability of the business.

To these previous premises we must add the absence of regulations of motorcycle use as public transport, which until recently was exclusively considered a vehicle for private use. This facilitates the incorporation of younger people without specific qualifications. Such data indicates the reason why the buying and selling of *jakartas* is legal, while the job of *jakartaman* finds itself in a legal limbo. With a lack of laws or norms to regulate their activity, motorbike taxis can circulate without any special requirements, license plating of the vehicle, or *licence de transport*. Consequently, the *jakartaman* profession has expanded in a rather uncontrolled manner in the last five years. What started as a temporary solution for the mobility of the city's inhabitants, ended up being a problem for the public Administration and their inability to manage its activity and growth; while bearing witness to the terrible working conditions of its drivers.

Although this activity could be labeled a priori as informal, it is somewhat regulated by the municipal Government. The *jakartmans* are required to pay monthly fees of 3,000FCFA (about 4.50€) to the Recette de Perception Municipale (RPM), even though, according to the Ziguinchor treasury agent in charge of this particular tax, in February of 2018 only 188 *jakartamans* had paid said fee. For this reason, at the end of each month, agents of the City Council go out to collect taxes, days in which

it is normal to see less motorbike taxis around the city, as those who have not paid hide in their houses and cease working. The paradox of this tax is that most of the *jakartamans* are not officially registered and some of them do not even have a drivers' license, or might not even be of the required age. Young people from the ages of 14 drive without any knowledge of traffic codes and laws, with the sole desire of maximizing their working day for the most profit.

Before this problem, in October 2014 the Association pour le développement des Jeunes Conducteurs de Zinguinchor was created to defend the rights of these workers versus the State, in the midst of dialogue and collaboration but, at times, confrontation. Even though this association is gaining more power, in 2018 only 311 *jakartamans* were officially enrolled. This organizations' objective is to ensure that drivers are officially recognized as workers by the Public Administration, changing their demands from a decent job within an informal system for labor rights before the State. In the last few years this association has evidenced the need for these types of workers to join a collective body that transcends ethnic or religious affiliations. In fact, the association has a manding majority, but there are Wólofs, Joolas, Peuls, Toucouleurs and Serers. It may be that, due to this ethnic diversity, there is a reason for their claim towards a legal authorization that includes them within a similar category to that of the "working class" (Henseman, 2001; Kohtari, 1989). Thus, leading to the opening of a direct conflict with the State, which in turn lead to riots in Zinguinchor in December 2017; even leading the president of the association and twelve of its members to be incarcerated for a week pending on trial on December 3, 2017. In January 2018 they were sanctioned with fines of different amounts and charged with public disorder.

Throughout the development of this research, it has been possible to attend several attempts by the association to collaborate with the administrative, judicial, fiscal or police authorities. Although the goal of legalizing the transport activity has not been achieved, it has been made clear on different occasions the interest by the Administration to establish collaborations that contribute to control the activity of motorbike taxis. An example of this is the football championship of March 2017, organized by the association of *jakartas* with the collaboration of the Administration and the Ministère de la Jeunesse, which had teams composed by *jakartamans*, policemen, firemen and merchants. The agreement for this championship states that they were allowed to play in the Stade Aline Sitoe Diatta de Zinguinchor in exchange for collaboration in various campaigns to raise awareness on road safety. Thus, the *jakartamans* pledged to take a

first aid course offered by the firemen as well as participated in a blood donation day in benefit to the Hôpital Régional de Ziguinchor.

Throughout the course of this research there was news of various meetings to negotiate accords, but they never yielded any results. The informants consulted, some of whom were members of the local police force, explained that this was due to the fact that many civil servants are the owners of said motorcycles and, if the activity is legalized, their benefits will decrease. One of these encounters, this one on a national level, was held on November 26, 2017 in Thiès, where all *jakarta* associations in Senegal were summoned to present to them the new project the president of the Republic, Macky Sall, to end with the motorbike taxi problematic, offering a new means of regularized and safer transport: the tricycle. Souleymane Sané, the president of the association of Ziguinchor, returned from the meeting with a signed agreement stipulating that, before the end of 2018, 50 tricycles would be delivered to the region. This measure has yet to be implemented in the year 2019, but according to some testimonies, this promise conditioned the youth vote in the last presidential elections on Sunday February 24 of this year.

In order to guarantee the good communication of various governmental apparatus, in August 2017, the Association pour le développement des Jeunes Conducteurs de Ziguinchor decided to constitute itself as a GIE (Groupement d'Intérêt Économique), a legally recognized body. Its main objective was to prioritize the collaboration between *jakartamans* and agents of the Ziguinchor City Council, as a means to manage aspects of this officially illegal profession and to do so with authorities who were not expected to recognize them as public transport but, hopefully, would later on accept their interlocution as private transport.

Precisely one of the first agreements made, as a GIE, was the *arrêtes* normative. In Ziguinchor the disproportionate growth of the *jakartas* over the last five years provoked that, in December 2017, the Association tallied over 150 *arrêtes* scattered throughout the city. In an internal meeting held in January 2018, it was agreed to establish a limitation on stops *jakartas* could make in order to rationalize the activity of motorbike taxis and, thus, continuing to relief issues of mobility of its population without paradoxically creating an obstacle to the flow of public space. After months of meetings with the City Council, and with the collaboration of the Dimbaya Kagnalen Federation and the Conseil Régional de la Jeunesse de Ziguinchor, in March 2018 it was made official that 75 zones would be established as *jakarta* stations. Each station has an elected manager between all the *jakartamans* and belongs to the *arrêt* in question, who moderates conflicts between drivers and represents them before the au-

thorities, while also being the collector of funds for internal ceremonies or dealing with the hospital in case of an accident, always under the supervision of the President of the association. Creating a system of self-regulation based on a voluntary organization that involves certain common interests and allows a certain degree of social protection to those who engage in this activity, without mattering whether it is legal or illegal, and always under the paradox of a local administration whom, despite not legalizing said activity, regulates its functioning and monitoring the urban space of the City Council.

Conclusion

In what has been stated so far, an attempt has been made to show how the activity of the *klandos* and *jakartas*, despite not being authorized or incurring, in many of its aspects, in illegality, does not take place in a “clandestine” manner — as the name *klandos* might suggest — nor outside the supervision of the authorities. Contradicting the assumptions made in a great number of the approximations on the question of “informality” in general — and particularly in Africa — the attention to how the activity of these vehicles is organized and developed highlights the constant links, many times deceiving, with the bureaucratic apparatus and the police. The formal-informal dichotomy is merely a theoretical resource that real social, economic and political relationships do not confirm.

What arises as a result of the analysis of both *klando* and *jakarta* systems is the detection of a continuous cooperative interaction between the orders of the formal and the informal in the same area that is urban transport, a hybrid governance of collaboration and contrapositions between local authorities and ways of socioeconomic organization that spend their time swinging between the legal, illegal and illegal. It is the distinctive features of the legal-administrative limits of mobility infrastructures that allow for the appearance and expansion of an offer of irregular transport such as those observed here. It is from this that we have been able to pay attention to the management of illegal taxis or motorbike taxis to recognize how the privatization through informalization is developed and determined by urban public powers in West Africa, allowing the development of a daily and ambivalent relationship with a State that, in its different branches, benefits from irregular activity without completely renouncing over its control.

This is what makes the questioning of certain assumptions regarding the informal relevant, referring to the heterogeneity of the processes that intervene in the organization of communal transport and its different

dynamics of relative insertion into legal framework; understanding that many times what we find in the field is a continuous readjustment of the fulfillment, or not, of different laws — more or less tolerated from an Administration that doesn't always act in a legal manner — depending on the costs, advantages and possibilities that come together in the development of the same activity. Far from operating on the margins of State apparatus or escaping its surveillance, certain practices considered as informal allow us to respond to the more or less deliberate shortcomings of governmental action, completing its performance and making possible the survival and maintenance of a State that does not always achieve or has no interest in reaching certain sectors of economic activity, nor is in the condition nor pretends to guarantee certain public services without ceasing to keep them under control, like, in our case, those that allow urban and interurban mobility of a good part of the population of the Lower Casamance.

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